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ABSTRACT: In this paper significant challenges are raised with re-
spect to the view that explanation essentially involves unification. 
These objections are raised specifically with respect to the well-known 
versions of unificationism developed and defended by Michael Fried-
man and Philip Kitcher. The objections involve the explanatory regress 
argument and the concepts of reduction and scientific understanding. 
Essentially, the contention made here is that these versions of unifica-
tionism wrongly assume that reduction secures understanding. 
KEYWORDS: Explanation; reduction; simplicity; scientific under-
standing, unification. 
1. Introduction 
 In post-Hempelian discussions of the nature of scientific explanation it 
is commonplace to note that one of the main functions of such explanation 
is to yield understanding, more specifically, scientific understanding.1 That 
                                                 
1  See (de Regt 2017) and (de Regt, et al. 2009). 
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Hempel’s covering-law model(s) of explanation failed to adequately ac-
count for this desideratum is one of the reasons that motivated the general 
rejection of the Hempelian account(s) of explanation.2 It is apparent then 
that a theory of scientific explanation that does not show how explana-
tions of these sorts yield such understanding is ipso facto inadequate. We 
can refer to this constraint on theories of explanation as the understanding 
thesis.  
 This paper explores how this constraint on one of the most prominent 
theories of explanation is supposed to be satisfied. In particular, it focuses 
on one of the most widely held successor theories to Hempel’s deductive-
nomological and inductive-statistical models of explanation: the view that 
explanation is a sort of global unification.3 This is the view that explanation 
is essentially achieved when a phenomenon or law is integrated into the 
simplest global system that organizes (or systematizes) our corpus of beliefs. 
In other words, explanation is a matter of showing how various, apparently 
unrelated, beliefs can be derived logically from a small set of premises or 
axioms, thereby reducing the number of beliefs that must be accepted as 
brute axiomatic beliefs. The argument presented here concludes that stand-
ard unificationist theories of explanation of this sort, like the most well-
known versions proposed by Michael Friedman (1974) and Philip Kitcher 
(1981, 1989, 1993), fail to convincingly show how unification yields under-
standing in any interesting, non-trivial, sense.  
 Establishing this result involves seriously contending with a particular 
traditional objection to explanation that has often been blithely ignored. 
This is the explanatory regress argument (ERA). This wide-scoped objection 
to accounts of explanation is based on the observation that explanations  
                                                 
2  See (Salmon 1989) for the canonical recounting of the relevant history of the 
concept of explanation, and (Lambert 1980) for some additional criticisms of the 
view that Hempel’s covering-law models yield understanding. (Woodward 2017) is 
also a useful survey of theories of explanation. 
3  Kitcher (1981) points out that lurking behind the official, logical empiricist, do-
ctrine espoused by Hempel was a version of the unificationist view he advocates. 
This implicit view can be found in (Hempel 1965, 1966) and in Feigl’s classic (1970). 
Prominent contemporary defenders of this view include Friedman (1974) and Kitcher 
(1981, 1989, 1993). 
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involve relating the unfamiliar to the familiar, or relating that which is not 
understood to that which is.4 According to the ERA bona fide explanation 
occurs only when that which is being explainedthe explanandumis ex-
plained by somethingthe explanansthat is already itself explained.5 
This point can then be related to scientific understanding by noting that 
understanding is, in an important sense, parasitic on explanation. Under-
standing can be achieved only by relating what we do not understand to 
what we do understand. But then (so the criticism goes) we are faced with 
what appears to be a regress that can be terminated only by the positing 
of some privileged body of explanatorily primitive unexplained explainers 
that themselves generate all understanding. As there do not appear to be 
such fundamental privileged explainers, it seems that if anything is ex-
plained at all and anything understood, explanation must not require that 
an explanandum can only be explained by an explanans that is itself already 
explained. Unificationists often portray themselves as being able to avoid 
this problem. For example, Friedman explicitly tells us that, 
This global view of scientific understanding [unificationism] also, 
it seems to me, provides the correct answer to the old argument 
that science is incapable of explaining anything because the basic 
phenomena to which others are reduced are themselves neither 
explained nor understood. According to this argument, science 
merely transfers our puzzlement from one phenomenon to an-
other; it replaces one surprising phenomenon by another equally 
surprising phenomenon. (Friedman 1974, 18) 
However, here it will be shown that unificationist views like Friedman’s 
do not provide an adequate answer to the ERA, and do not provide an 
acceptable account of the relation between explanation and understand-
ing. 
                                                 
4  This is especially true of (Friedman 1974). 
5  The real worry behind the ERA appears to be that if we do not require that the 
explanans is itself explained, we will be forced to posit unexplained explainers to 
terminate the regress or we must argue that explanation is somehow generated sui 
generis by the explanation relation. In ignoring the ERA, and adopting a global view 
of explanation the unificationists seem to favor the second option.  
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 It will be argued that in attempting to avoid the ERA and replace 
Hempel’s covering-law model of explanation, unificationist views fail to con-
nect explanation to understanding in any interesting, non-trivial, sense. The 
failure on the part of the unificationists to adequately link explanation to 
understanding non-trivially, is in part the result of the unrealistic epistemic 
nature of the unificationist view and the acceptance of two dogmatic views 
about the relationships between simplicity, truth and understanding. To 
put the point generally, the unificationist view of explanation requires ep-
istemic agents and communities to possess computational resources that far 
exceed those that are available, and so cannot possibly yield a realistic ac-
count of scientific understanding or it leads to skepticism about explana-
tion. Since neither of these views is acceptable, it will be suggested that the 
unificationist view should be rejected. 
 On a more positive note, it will be suggested that examination both of 
the ERA and of the criticisms of the unificationist view reveals that there 
are two distinct but equally important concepts of scientific understanding 
that should be distinguished. The first concept is that of semantic under-
standing. The second is that of reduction. When these different senses of 
‘understanding’ are properly distinguished, it is possible to foresee the con-
struction of a complete, non-skeptical and naturalistically acceptable ac-
count of explanation that can truly yield an acceptable account of scientific 
understanding.  
2. Explanation as unification 
 Before turning to the critical appraisal of the unificationist view, we 
must look at the details of the unificationist theory of explanation. As al-
ready noted, the two most prominent versions of unificationism are those 
independently offered by Michael Friedman and by Philip Kitcher. So, first, 
we need to examine the basic details of these views with an eye to deter-
mining how Kitcher’s and Friedman’s specific unificationist views of expla-
nation are supposed to yield scientific understanding, as per the understand-
ing thesis. Note, however, that sections 2.3 and 2.4 contain presentations of 
the technical details, respectively, of Friedman’s and Kitcher’s views of ex-
planatory unification and these sections can be skipped or skimmed over 
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for those who are not especially interested in the technicalities involved. 
Ultimately, as we shall see, what is most important is that we note that 
both Friedman and Kitcher subscribe to a core set of views about explana-
tion that involves unification and simplification that is supposed to satisfy 
the understanding thesis. Let us then begin by looking at the informal ver-
sions of Friedman’s and Kitcher’s views of explanatory unification. 
2.1. Friedman, Kitcher and unificationism 
 Friedman presents a version of the unificationist view that is based on 
the idea that what we are inclined to regard as being in need of explanation 
are laws and not ordinarily events, pace Hempel. More crucially, explana-
tion of laws is achieved by showing that the phenomenon described by the 
target law are really just cases of some other phenomenon described by 
a more fundamental law. This is just the familiar relation of reduction, and 
Friedman candidly tells us that, 
The central problem for the theory of explanation comes down to 
this: what is the relation between phenomena in virtue of which 
one phenomenon can constitute an explanation of another, and 
what is it about this relation that gives understanding of the ex-
plained phenomenon. (Friedman 1974, 6) 
So for unificationists like Friedman it would seem to be the case that ex-
planation, and thereby understanding, is supposed to be achieved by reduc-
tion. Friedman motivates the consideration of unificationism as a serious 
option by rejecting as inadequate Hempel’s covering-law model, and what 
he, respectively, calls the familiarity and intellectual fashions views of ex-
planation. 
 The intellectual fashions view will be ignored here as it is irrelevant to 
the issue raised in this paper, but the familiarity view will play a more 
important role in the arguments to follow. Essentially the familiarity view 
holds that explanation is a matter of relating the unexplained to the ex-
plained by relating the unfamiliar to the familiar. Friedman’s specific criti-
cisms of these views will not be repeated here. However, in criticizing these 
two views, Friedman importantly establishes a set of three desiderata that 
any adequate theory of explanation should satisfy: 
6  Michael J. Shaffer 
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 (DE1) The theory should be sufficiently general. 
 (DE2) The theory should be objective. 
(DE3) The theory should connect explanation and understanding 
(Friedman 1974, 13-14).6 
It is clear from the passage quoted in section 1 that Friedman is especially 
concerned to show that his own account of explanation is capable of satis-
fying DE3, but he is also careful to explain that, 
When I ask that a theory of scientific explanation tell us what it 
is about the explanation relation that produces understanding, 
I do not suppose that ‘scientific understanding’ is a clear notion. 
Nor do I suppose that it is possible to say what scientific under-
standing is in advance of giving a theory of explanation. It is not 
reasonable to require that a theory of explanation proceed by first 
defining ‘scientific understanding’ and then showing how its re-
construction of the explanation relation produces scientific un-
derstanding. We can find out what scientific understanding con-
sists in only by finding out what scientific explanation is and vice 
versa. (Friedman 1974, 6) 
This disclaimer is rather troubling, and this passage contains an anticipation 
of the criticism that unificationism only trivially satisfies DE3. Later we will 
return to this issue, but, at this point, it suffices to note that Friedman sees 
traditional views of explanation as all failing to satisfy one or more of DE1-
DE3 and argues that unificationism does not suffer from these problems. 
 In the place of the more traditional theories of explanation, Friedman 
then offers us unificationism as a replacement. Friedman’s unificationist 
theory depends on the following core intuition: 
Science increases our understanding of the world by reducing the 
total number of independent phenomena that we have to accept 
as ultimate or given. A world with fewer phenomena is, other 
things equal, more comprehensible than one with more. (Fried-
man 1974, 15) 
                                                 
6  DE3 is, of course, just the understanding thesis mentioned in the introduction. 
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Friedman’s views about explanation then essentially include the following 
ideas. First, explanation is unification. Second, the best unification is the 
simplest one. Finally, explanation yields understanding because the simplest 
unification is the most understandable one. This last point is crucial to note. 
On Friedman’s view the best unification is understandable because it re-
quires us to accept the total systematization of our beliefs about some body 
of phenomena that involves the fewest primitive beliefs. 
 Having laid out the details of Friedman’s view we can now turn our 
attention to Kitcher’s view, and it is interesting to note that Kitcher’s view 
was constructed as a sympathetic, but critical, reaction to the deficiencies 
of Friedman’s unificationist analysis of explanation.7 Kitcher’s unification-
ism is then importantly similar to that of Friedman. Most crucially, it is 
clear that Kitcher and Friedman have (at least roughly) the same sort of 
idea in mind concerning the issue of how unification yields explanation, and 
thereby, understanding. Specifically, it is by the reduction of our set of our 
antecedently accepted beliefs, K, to the simplest systematization of those 
beliefs that is supposed to issue in greater understanding. This is ultimately 
due to the simplicity of the reducing set of beliefs. In his (1989) Kitcher 
explicitly introduces the following principle of acceptance for systematic 
unifications: 
 (U) S should be chosen over S′ as the explanatory store over K, E(K), 
just in case S has greater unifying power with respect to K than 
S′ (Kitcher 1989, 477). 
Essentially what Kitcher advocates is that we accept the global theory that 
best unifies, that best explains, the totality of our antecedent beliefs by 
showing that they can be derived from a small set of special argument pat-
terns involving a small set of basic (axiomatically accepted) beliefs that, in 
part, constitute the reducing theory.  
 As with Friedman’s view what we have here is a form of inference to the 
best explanation (IBE), where the quality, or ‘bestness’, of an explanation is 
to be measured in terms of its ability to simplify our global belief system 
and thus supposedly generate understanding. Kitcher explicitly tells us, 
                                                 
7  In fact, (Kitcher 1976) is intended to be an explicit criticism of Friedman’s ac-
count of explanatory unification. 
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I have sketched an account of explanation as unification, at-
tempting to show that such an account has the resources to pro-
vide insight into episodes in the history of science and to over-
come some traditional problems for the covering law model. In 
doing so, let me indicate very briefly how my view of explanation 
as unification suggests how scientific explanation yields under-
standing. By using a few patterns of argument in the derivation 
of many beliefs we minimize the number of types of premises we 
must take as underived. That is, we reduce, in a far as is possible, 
the number of types of facts we must accept as brute. Hence we 
can endorse something close to Friedman’s view of the merits of 
scientific explanation. (Kitcher 1981, 529) 
So, as with Fiedman’s unificationism, such a reduction is supposed to make 
our global belief system more understandable by reducing the number of 
independent facts we must accept as basic, and so Kitcher also endorses 
DE3. 
2.2. Friedman’s formal account of unification8 
 For those interested in the technical details, Friedman gives this infor-
mal idea a formal treatment as follows. We are to regard a scientific com-
munity C, at a given time t, as accepting a set of law-like sentences K. In 
other words, K is the set of laws accepted in C at t. K is to be understood 
to be deductively closed such that if S is a law-like sentence and K ⊦ S, then 
S ∊ K. We are then supposed to accept the systematization of K that re-
duces K to the smallest set of independently acceptable sentences, where 
independent acceptability is characterized as follows: 
 i. If S ⊦ Q, then S is not acceptable independent of Q. 
 ii. If S is acceptable independently of P and Q ⊦ P, then S is acceptable 
independently of Q. (Friedman 1974, 16) 
Reduction is to be understood formally in the following manner. We first 
define a partition of the sentence S as the set of sentences Γ such that Γ is 
                                                 
8  As noted previously, readers who are not interested in the formal details of 
Friedman’s view can skip this section. 
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logically equivalent to S and each S′, where S′ ∊ Γ, is acceptable inde-
pendently of S. Moreover, a sentence will be K-atomic if it has no partition 
in the sense just defined, and a K-partition of a set of sentences Δ will be 
a set Γ of K-atomic sentences logically equivalent to Δ. The K-cardinality 
of a set Δ, abbreviated K-card (Δ), is defined as inf {card (Γ): Γ is  
a K-partition of Δ}. We then get one of the key concepts of Friedman’s 
unificationist view. S reduces the set Δ, if and only if, K-card (Δ ∩ {S}) > 
K-card (Δ). He then tells us that what we really want reduced is the number 
of independently acceptable consequences of S, conK(S).  
 Friedman then ultimately defines explanation as follows:  
 (DI′) S1 explains S2 if and only if there exists a partition Γ of S1 and an 
Si ∊ Γ such that S2 ∊ conK(Si) and Si reduces conK(Si). (Friedman 
1974, 17) 
On this basis, Friedman presents us with a relatively simple formal treat-
ment of explanation as global unification that is supposed to yield under-
standing because global systematizations with fewer independent phenom-
ena that we must understand primitively are more understandable. Pre-
sumably, we are supposed to accept the theory that best explains K for C 
at t, and the best explanation of K is that reduction of K in accord with 
DI´ that is globally the simplest reduction in the sense of simplicity just 
specified. Again, it is precisely because such unifications are simpler that 
they are supposed to be more understandable and this formal model shows 
how this works in terms of the concept of the simplest reduction. 
2.3. Kitcher’s alternative formal account of unificationism9 
 Kitcher too offers a formal account of the unificationist view of expla-
nation, but it is presented in terms of a very different technical framework 
from that employed by Friedman. In any case, the main idea behind 
Kitcher’s alternative version of unificationism is captured in the following 
passage: 
                                                 
9  As noted previously, this section can be skipped by those who are not interested 
in the formal details of Kitcher’s view. 
10  Michael J. Shaffer 
Organon F 2019: 1–27 
The general problem I have set is that of specifying E(K), the 
explanatory store over K, which is the set of arguments accepta-
ble as the basis for acts of explanation by those whose beliefs are 
exactly the members of K. (For purposes of this paper I shall 
assume that, for each K there is exactly on E(K). 
 The unofficial view [unificationism] answers the problem: for 
each K, E(K) is the set of arguments which best unifies K. My 
task is to articulate this answer. (Kitcher 1981, 512) 
It is important to note that Kitcher is focusing on the unification of K by 
appeal to a set of general argument patterns, and argument patterns are 
not argument forms in the sense employed in modern formal logic. As 
Kitcher understands them, argument patterns are more context-specific and 
less abstract than logical argument forms. Moreover, the reducing theory is 
not merely a set of sentences as in the case of Friedman’s view. According 
to Kitcher each theory is constituted, in part, by a set of accepted argument 
styles, or canonical argument patterns that are regarded as ‘good’.  
 Kitcher elaborates on this idea, and tells us that a generating set Σ is a 
set of argument patterns Π such that each argument in Σ instantiates a 
pattern in Π. A generating set for Σ is complete with respect to K, if and 
only if, every argument which is acceptable relative to K and which instan-
tiates a pattern in Π is a member of Σ. To select the explanatory store E(K) 
we first narrow our choice to those sets of arguments which are acceptable 
relative to K, the possible systematizations of K. From among the various 
generating sets of argument patterns that are complete with respect to K, 
in accordance with U we select that set with the greatest unifying power 
and we call the selected set the basis of the set of arguments in question. 
E(K), the explanatory store over is K, that systematization whose basis 
does best by the criteria of unifying power (Kitcher 1981, 519-20). Im-
portantly, this includes the idea that the best systematization is that which 
is simplest. So, let us then turn our attention to the central concept 
Kitcher’s account explanation, the concept of unifying power. 
 Kitcher begins his explication of the concept of explanation as unifica-
tion by offering a series of related definitions that are to be used in defining 
what he refers to as a general argument pattern. A schematic sentence is 
an expression generated by replacement of at least one of the non-logical 
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expressions in the sentence with dummy letters. For each schematic sen-
tence there must also be a set of filling instructions that specify how the 
dummy letters are to be replaced. A schematic argument is then a set of 
schematic sentences, and a classification for such an argument is a set of 
sentences describing the inferential features of the schematic argument. The 
classification, in effect, identifies which sentences are premises, which sentence 
is the conclusion, what logical rules of inference are used, etc. Kitcher then 
defines a general argument pattern as a sequence of sentences such that: 
a. The sequence has the same number of terms as the schematic argu-
ment of the general argument pattern. 
b. Each sentence in the sequence is obtained from the corresponding 
schematic sentence in accordance with the appropriate filling instruc-
tions. 
c. It is possible to construct a chain of reasoning which assigns to each 
sentence the status accorded to the corresponding schematic sentence 
by the classification (Kitcher 1981, 516-17). 
The task that Kitcher then undertakes is to explicate the concept of the 
unifying power of a set of argument patterns so that we can determine 
which set is the best explanatory unification of K. 
 After proposing that the unifying power of a set of argument patterns 
should be defined as the ability of those argument patterns to generate “…a 
large number of accepted sentences as the conclusions of acceptable argu-
ments which instantiate a few, stringent patterns (Kitcher 1981, 520),” 
Kitcher points out that this suggestion will not work. Rather mysteriously, 
he then abandons the attempt to specify the concept of unifying power more 
precisely. Nonetheless, he does give us some idea of what he has in mind. 
First we define the conclusion set of a set of arguments Σ, as the set of 
sentences which occur as conclusions, C(Σ), of some argument that is 
a member of Σ. Kitcher then suggests that the unifying power of a reduction 
base Bi with respect to K varies with the size of C(Σi) and the stringency 
of the patterns of Bi, and inversely with the number of members of Bi 
(Kitcher 1981, 520). The idea is to select the smallest set of premises that 
generates the largest conclusion set with respect to our belief system.  
12  Michael J. Shaffer 
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 The concept of stringency is itself left undefined, but Kitcher explains 
that the stringency of an argument pattern is determined by the strictness 
of the conditions governing the substitution of dummy letters in argument 
patterns and conditions governing acceptable logical structure (Kitcher 
1981, 518). The former are fixed, for the most part, by the filling instruc-
tions, the latter by the classification. Considering the stringency of sets of 
argument patterns is introduced in order to rule out cases both where all 
argument patterns are acceptable relative to K and where only one unique 
argument is acceptable relative to K. In any case, Kitcher admits that this 
account of unifying is too simple and quite vague, but he offers nothing 
more well-developed as a replacement for this account of unifying power. 
Kitcher does note that, in addition to counting numbers of argument pat-
terns, the concept of unifying power probably also ought to include in some 
way the similarities among such argument patterns, but he offers no deeper 
account of this concept. 
2.4. Kitcher, Friedman and the common basis of unificationism   
 The unificationists we have considered (who are without any doubt the 
most well-known defenders of unificationism) hold that the best explana-
tion, the one that we ought to accept, is the simplest systematization of our 
belief corpus. As it happens, this belief system is also supposed to be the 
one that affords us the most understanding. Kitcher and Friedamn are then 
clearly advocating a sophisticated form of IBE (or what Peirce variously 
called abduction or the method of hypothesis) on a global scale. More to 
the point, on their view the ‘bestness’ of an explanation is understood in 
terms of a kind of simplicity as it applies to reduction bases.10 On this 
general point about the virtues of simplicity they are, in fact, in broad 
agreement with Peirce himself who often stressed the role of economy in 
abductive inference and in science in general, as is the case with most 
defenders of IBE.11 But, they apply this notion of simplicity to complete 
belief systems as opposed to localized sets of beliefs. Consequently, the, 
                                                 
10  We are here ignoring the differences between Peirce’s conceptions of abduction 
and retroduction as developed in his later views. 
11  See, for example, Peirce (c. 1901/1931-1958, 6.529-6.5230 and 7.220). 
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the generic rule of theory acceptance such unificationists appear to en-
dorse is: 
 (URA) Accept the best explanation of a total system of beliefs where 
the best explanation is the globally simplest unification of 
a global system of beliefs/sentences. 
It is important to note, however, Peirce does not in any obvious way, seem 
to be committed to the idea that abduction is global in this sense, and this 
is the source of considerable trouble for unificationism.12 In what follows, 
we will find that there is some reason to suspect that this kind of global 
IBE is not a computationally feasible form of inference. However, before 
turning our attention to the critique of unificationism, let us first look at 
one of its supposed successes.  
2.5. The explanatory regress argument and unification 
 One of the virtues that unificationists have claimed for their theory is 
the avoidance of the ERA. As we saw in section 1, Friedman is especially 
clear about this virtue of his version of unificationism. His main objection 
to familiarity views like that defended by Dray (1964) and, to some degree, 
by Scriven (1970), is that we often explain laws by appeal to other laws 
with which we are less familiar. If this is so and we believe that these sorts 
of cases are bona fide instances of explanation, then explanation cannot be 
relating the unfamiliar to the familiar. Unification does not require relating 
the unfamiliar to the familiar and supposedly secures the connection be-
tween explanation and understanding by linking explanation with unifica-
tion, and thereby simplicity. The unificationists avoid the ERA by ignoring 
it and simply jettisoning the requirement that we are more familiar with 
the explanans material than we are with the explanandum material.  
 Friedman is correct on this count. However, for the unificationists global 
unification in the simplest system then replaces any consideration of the 
kind of understanding discussed by familiarity theorists, but it is here where 
the unificationists go wrong. We can explain phenomena by relating them 
                                                 
12  Some problems with treating inference to the best explanation globally are 
discussed in (Shaffer 2012) and in (Fodor 2000). 
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to unfamiliar theories. Simply consider most classical explanations of mi-
croscopic phenomena by quantum mechanics (QM). Friedman is correct 
that we are most assuredly not more familiar with the relevant aspects of 
the QM explanations. Nevertheless, we must possess an important kind of 
understanding of the reducing theory if such an explanation is to yield real 
understanding and so the familiarity theorists are correct to take the ERA 
seriously. In the particular case of QM, it is plausible to believe now that 
this principle is satisfied. Pace Friedman, it is not the unfamiliarity of 
reducing theories that is the real issue, but rather the issue is whether we 
understand the reducing theory in some relevant sense. On the one hand, 
all novel theories are unfamiliar, but his need not entail that they are not 
understood. On the other hand, familiar theories may not be such that 
they are understood. As such, it is a critical mistake to merely equate 
understanding with familiarity, and thus ignore the ERA as Friedman 
does.13  
3. The failure of unificationism 
 So where does unificationism go wrong? As outlined in the introduction, 
unificationism fails for several closely connected reasons. First, in attempt-
ing to avoid the ERA unificationism places great, unwarranted, faith in the 
metaphysical view that our world is ultimately simple and in the view that 
the world can be successfully explained by a simple global theory. This is 
important because these particular articles of faith must be true for it to be 
possible for us to cognitively grasp entire, global, scientific belief systems 
(i.e. belief corpuses) that potentially apply to an ultimately comprehensible 
world. All of this must be the case because unificationists require that we 
be able to compare the simplicity of such explanatory systems and accept 
the simplest systematization of the observed facts about the world. But, it 
is not at all clear that our world is simple in this sense, and it is not com-
putationally and epistemically feasible that we could (even as a community) 
                                                 
13  The unificationists do not really avoid the ERA anyway, as they do not offer an 
account of how the basic beliefs are themselves understood. 
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compare global belief systems in the manner that unificationists require, 
even if global belief systems turn out to be relatively simple. 
 Supposing that we could manage to avoid these metaphysical and com-
putational problems, it will be shown here that, pace the unificationists, the 
simplest unified belief corpus may not provide us with understanding in the 
relevant sense of the term and that the resulting unified system may not 
even be likely to be true. So, firstly, it will be argued here that unification 
is not sufficient for understanding and that the unificationists’ account of 
explanation does not track the truth. In other words, given the unification-
ist view of explanation, it is perfectly possible that the best explanation (i.e. 
the simplest global unification of our scientific beliefs) is not understandable 
at all and may well be false. By DE3 (and DE2), it then follows that unifi-
cationism should be rejected if actual human understanding is factive. In 
any case, let us now turn our attention to the details of these criticisms of 
unificationism.  
3.1. Two dogmas of simplicity 
 As the expositions of Friedman’s and Kitcher’s views show, the essential 
motivation behind unificationism appears to involve a particular notion of 
reduction that relates explanation to simplicity, and thereby explanation to 
understanding. This unificationist argument essentially involves three steps. 
The first step (S1) is to define explanation and best explanation in terms 
of the unification of belief systems. The second step (S2) is to note that 
such unification implies simplification. Finally, the third step (S3) is to 
argue that simpler theories are more understandable. The various elements 
of this line of reasoning are found in Kitcher’s and Friedman’s claims that 
we have examined in earlier sections and it is obvious that there is broad 
agreement between Friedman and Kitcher in this respect. This argument, 
however, depends on at least two crucial assumptions. First, the unifica-
tionists appear to accept the view that, other things equal, a numerically 
smaller system of beliefs and/or inference schemes is more understandable. 
Second, as Friedman and Kitcher both do not appear to be skeptics and 
seem to believe that we can successfully (i.e. truthfully) explain phenomena 
and thereby understand the world, it must be the case that they believe 
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that the world really is, at least relatively, simple in some ontological 
sense.14  
 These assumptions are what we will call the two dogmas of simplicity. 
This first view, that a numerically smaller belief system is more understand-
able, is the dogma of epistemic simplicity (DES). The second dogma, the 
view that the world really is simple, as the dogma of metaphysical simplicity 
(DMS). As we shall see, both are mere dogmas and neither is non-contro-
versially true. Nevertheless, their general acceptance−tacit or otherwise−has 
made unificationism rather more appealing than it otherwise would be, es-
pecially in light of their ignoring the ERA. DES is a crucial assumption 
behind S3 of the unificationist argument and DEM is, similarly, crucial for 
justifying S1 and S2. 
3.2. The dogma of metaphysical simplicity 
 The unificationists’ implied view that the world is simple appears either 
to be a matter of blind faith or it is an a priori matter, for surely it is not 
clearly the case on empirical grounds. However, as it is obvious that the 
fact of the matter concerning the simplicity of the world cannot be an a pri-
ori issue, the unificationists’ assumption that the world is fundamentally 
simple appears merely to be a dogmatic assumption. In fact, empirical con-
siderations seem to support the view that our world is rather complex, and 
that the world is divided into more than one independent domain charac-
terized by entirely different, non-reducible, laws. Therefore, as neither appeal-
ing to faith nor to a prioricity is, at least in this case, legitimate, it seems 
that there is then no real substantive reason to suspect that our world really 
is simple. 15 Hence, we should have serious doubts that simple theories are 
more likely to be true, and this raises serious problems for unificationists. 
 Consider the following conditions of adequacy concerning explanation 
and IBE, all of which the unificationists appear to accept (implicitly or 
otherwise): 
                                                 
14  If this were not the case, then it is unclear what the purpose of the many 
examples of allegedly successful explanation are. 
15  See (Fodor 1974; Dupré 1983; Cartwright 1999; and Shaffer 2012) for related 
points. 
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 (CA1) The explanans of a bona fide explanation must bear some relation 
to the truth.16 
 (CA2) There is some connection between an explanation being the best 
explanation and that explanation’s truth; the best explanation is 
likely to be true and, 
 (CA3) The ‘bestness’ of explanation is a function of its simplicity.17 
If there is some connection between an explanation being the best explana-
tion and that explanation’s truth in this way (i.e. if CA2 and CA3 are 
correct in a way that allows CA1 to be satisfied), then, unless there is some 
non-dogmatic reason to believe DMS, the unificationists’ view of the con-
nection between unification and truth of explanation cannot be adequate. 
This is because they offer no reason to accept CA2 and CA3 except that 
doing so allows us to trivially link explanation and understanding in order 
to satisfy DA3. However, as it is not obviously the case that DMS is true 
and we do not have any justifications for accepting CA2 and CA3, we have 
no reason to suspect that CA1 is satisfied by the unificationists’ views of 
explanation. As such, it is neither obviously true that simpler, more unified, 
global belief systems are explanatory, nor is it obviously true that simpler, 
more unified, global systems of belief are more likely to be true. So S1 and 
S2 of the unificationist argument are thus impugned. 
3.3. The dogma of epistemic simplicity 
 In order to support S3 the unificationists argue that we ought to accept 
the simplest systematization of our scientific beliefs where the simplest sys-
tematization is the belief system that reduces the number of phenomena or 
inference patterns describing the phenomena to the smallest number by 
unification. As we have seen, the putative reason for doing so is that the 
simplest globally unified system of this sort is supposed to be the most 
understandable. Essentially, they believe that a system that is reductively 
simplified by unification is supposedly more understandable. This is an  
                                                 
16  As is well known, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) argue that the explanans must 
be true. 
17  Lipton (1991) and Thagard (1988) defend these conditions of adequacy for IBE. 
18  Michael J. Shaffer 
Organon F 2019: 1–27 
article of pure epistemological faith (another dogma), and it is a view that 
is easily exploded if we take the ERA seriously, as the unificationists do 
not.  
 It seems obvious that a system that is unified in the unificationists’ sense 
may be completely incomprehensible. Simply consider a belief system that 
is unified in this manner, but which reduces the apparent plethora of phe-
nomena to a unified but relatively small (axiomatic) reduction base that is 
not itself understood at all. Should we really say that such a system provides 
us with an explanation that yields understanding? Surely not. The following 
well-understood sort of case demonstrates this and history is replete with 
examples of such non-explanatory reductive thinking. Suppose that a cog-
nitive agent or a cognitive community attributes to all phenomena a rela-
tively unified, but inscrutable, set of causes: say a sophisticated kind of deus 
ex machina reduction base.18 This is just the sort of familiar but bad reduc-
tive reasoning involved in forms of supernaturalism and mysterianism. It 
amounts to the contention that some suitably unified inscrutable source(s) 
of power accounts for all observable phenomena. Such reductions do not 
explain and they do they generate understanding. Second, consider a case 
where we have a unified global reduction base−for example that proposed 
by defenders of string theory−the basic concepts of which are arguably of 
greater internal (semantic) complexity than the disparate phenomena it is 
supposed to unify. In this particular case, the various phenomena associated 
with the general theory of relativity with those of quantum mechanics are 
supposed to be unified by reduction, but the concepts/argument patterns 
of string theory, although numerically fewer in number, appear to be of 
much greater mathematical/conceptual complexity than either of the theo-
ries it reduces. It is at least plausible then to suggest that we should not 
count such a reduction as yielding understanding in any serious manner. 
                                                 
18  Kitcher considers the theological version of this response in his (1980), and 
concludes that it can be rejected on the basis that it fails to be adequately stringent. 
However, he offers no substantive account of the stringency of argument patterns. 
In any case, we can imagine arbitrary non-theological cases that employ sufficiently 
stringent argument patterns the component terms of which we do not understand at 
all. Behe’s (1996) intelligent design theory might well be a theoretical unification of 
this sort. 
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Finally, consider a reduction base that is composed of a small set of incon-
sistent propositions. From these inconsistent axioms we can trivially derive 
all other propositions in our belief corpus, but we surely would not want to 
say that such a set of propositions is coherently understood in some brute 
manner that explains the propositions derived from them and generates 
understanding. Such a reduction base cannot even be true, let alone allow 
us to understand the propositions derived from them.  
 In the first case we have a reduction base that is numerically small, but 
which, intuitively, yields no understanding due to its incomprehensibility, 
and in the second case we find that reduction in the number of factors 
accepted as primitive in a theory may, ultimately, make for a more concep-
tually complex (i.e. semantically complex) and less understandable global 
theory. In the third case we have a reduction in the number of brute facts 
accepted and a derivation of all other propositions we accept, but no un-
derstanding of them because the reduction base is inconsistent. Cases of 
these sorts can easily be multiplied and articulated, but the details are not 
really important here. What is important is that cases one and two can be 
avoided only if the unificationists, by stipulation, simply equate understand-
ing with unification in order to obviate S1–S3 and thereby satisfy DE3 
trivially as a matter of definition. Given that this is clearly not an accepta-
ble way to justify the steps of the unificationist argument, it seems then, 
at very least, to be the case that unification is not clearly a sufficient 
condition for scientific understanding. Cases of the third sort are trickier 
to avoid and this can be done only by requiring that we eliminate incon-
sistent reductions from the set of potentially acceptable unifications in some 
principled manner. As we shall subsequently see, however, this is not real-
istically possible. 
 Unification cannot be a necessary condition of explanation for natural-
ists without leading to outright skepticism, and Kitcher (1981, 1983, 1992, 
1993), in particular, is an avowed naturalist.19 Non-naturalists like Fried-
man (2000, 2001) are faced with a related, but different, problem. Such, 
non-naturalists can treat unification as a necessary condition of explanation 
and avoid skepticism only by attributing a priori faculties to us that exceed 
                                                 
19  Friedman, however, is an avowed non-naturalist as his (2000) and (2001) indi-
cate. 
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well-verified computational constraints on any feasible inference procedure. 
How do these particular problems arise? First, consider what the unifica-
tionists’ view of explanation would require of cognitive agents or cognitive 
communities. What they must be able to do is to compare total, global, 
unifications of our knowledge corpus, and then accept the one that is the 
simplest (in terms of some specified criterion of reductive simplicity) from 
among the array of possibilities. It turns out that such a task is not com-
putationally satisfiable in realistic times for even finite sets of finite and 
very small systems of beliefs, even with the aid of all available computa-
tional resources.20 In fact, even if we accept the dubious assumption that 
the linguistic representations of particular belief corpuses are finite in size 
and that we need only consider a finite set of such systems, we cannot check 
the consistency of relatively simple systems with available computational 
resources in feasible times, let alone check the consistency of and compare 
all logically possible systematizations of our beliefs in terms of their overall 
simplicity. However, we must be able to check the consistency of such sys-
tems or URA might well−in violation of CA1 and CA2−sanction our accept-
ing very simple but inconsistent systematizations of our beliefs as explana-
tory. As we have seen, this is because all of our beliefs can trivially be 
derived from inconsistent sets of such axioms. To avoid such cases we 
must first delimit the (infinite) set of possible alternative systematizations 
to those that are logically consistent, and then we are supposed to select 
that consistent systematization from among the remaining set that fares 
best in terms of URA. However, it is not even physically possible to check 
for the consistency of such systematizations, let alone assess the compara-
tive global simplicity of an infinite set of consistent systematizations of our 
beliefs.21 
 Given these deeply troubling (but well-known) facts about the compu-
tational features of belief systems and URA, unificationists like Kitcher who 
accept naturalism must be skeptics. This is because we cannot apply URA 
                                                 
20  See (Kornblith 1989) and (Cherniak 1986) for explicit consideration of such com-
putational restrictions on epistemic processes. Also, see (Harman 1986) for discussion 
of the computational problem that arise for belief systems of infinite size. It is crucial 
to note that any belief system closed under logical consequence will be infinite. 
21  (Cherniak 1986) is the canonical source on this point. 
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in practice in such a way that it can be satisfied and so we cannot really 
ever explain anything. Given these same facts, unificationists like Friedman, 
who accept some form of non-naturalism, must attribute to us almost occult 
a priori epistemic faculties that exceed computational/mathematical con-
straints on feasible, or even physically possible, procedures in order to allow 
for the satisfaction of URA. Both approaches are obviously unacceptable, 
and so, at very least, unificationism is either utterly unrealistic or deeply 
committed to skepticism. Consequently, unification is not a plausible nec-
essary condition for explanation.  
4. Two types of understanding 
 As mentioned in the introduction, it appears to be the case that two 
senses of ‘understanding’ are often conflated in discussions of scientific ex-
planation. Not surprisingly, the conflation of these two concepts has led to 
considerable misunderstanding on the part of the parties to the traditional 
debate concerning scientific explanation and, more recently, to the debate 
concerning how explanation relates to understanding. However, the ERA 
provides us with great insight into this error, and this is why it is important 
that we take the ERA seriously. It just will not do do to sweep it under the 
rug as traditional and unworthy of serious consideration as the unification-
ists seem to do.  
 Ignoring the ERA has made the unificationist view appear to be rather 
more plausible than it really is. Moreover, this myopia is the root cause of 
the kinds of problems that afflict the unificationist view raised here. In 
effect, what unificationists appear to have done by ignoring the ERA is to 
equate (unwarrantedly and by mere stipulation) scientific understanding 
with simplifying reduction and simplifying reduction with explanation, 
thereby trivially satisfying DA3 (i.e. the understanding thesis). In doing so 
they ignore the concept of semantic understanding and this is the concept 
that is the real core of scientific understanding. Simply put, scientific un-
derstanding is not wholly a matter of reductive explanation. Thus, the uni-
ficationist view does not satisfy one of the constraints on theories of expla-
nation that the proponents of unificationism themselves accept. 
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4.1. Reductive understanding and semantic understanding 
 So, in ignoring the ERA and accepting both the DES and the DMS 
without justification, the unificationists have overlooked one of the key con-
cepts constitutive of scientific understanding, semantic understanding. This 
point is related to Heisenberg’s observation that, 
For an adequate understanding of the phenomena, the first con-
dition is the introduction of adequate concepts; only with the help 
of the correct concepts can we really know what has been ob-
served. When we enter a new field, very often new concepts are 
needed, and these new concepts come up in a rather unclear and 
underdeveloped form. Later they are modified, sometimes they 
are almost completely abandoned and replaced by better concepts 
which then, finally, are clear and well-defined. (Heisenberg 1989, 
19) 
The relevant point in this passage (that we must have adequate concepts 
to achieve understanding) is made more poignant when coupled with Hei-
senberg’s view that theoretical formalisms that describe phenomena are dis-
tinct from the concepts that, at least in part, are required for understanding 
of the phenomena in question.22 For Heisenberg, scientific understanding 
involves some form of understanding of the concepts that allow us to con-
ceive of the phenomena in terms of some theoretical (i.e. mathematical) 
formalism. However, from this passage it is clear that Heisenberg believes 
that understanding comes in degrees and that, often, we adopt a theory 
without adequate concepts in hand sufficient to generate complete under-
standing. Ultimately, inadequate and imprecise concepts are replaced by 
adequate and precise concepts in order to secure scientific understanding of 
the phenomena in question. We can employ a theory in practice without 
complete understanding of the theory, but then the theory should not be 
considered to be fully explanatory. It is only when we come to grasp the 
complete meanings of the fundamental terms of a theory adequately, no 
matter how globally simple the theory is, that we have a bona fide expla-
nation of the phenomena it describes.23 
                                                 
22  See (Heisenberg 1930), especially chapters 1-3 and the appendix. 
23  See (Radder 1991; Shaffer 2008a; and 2008b) on this matter. 
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 So, it appears to be the case that a form of semantic understanding is 
needed here and that semantic understanding involves a form of truth-con-
ditional semantics.24 As such, a theory of explanation that incorporates this 
concept seems as if it might do better in accounting for the connection 
between truth, explanation, and understanding than unificationism does. 
That the unificationists have overlooked this concept is, again, primarily 
due to their ignoring the ERA and due to their tacit acceptance of a holistic 
version of conceptual, or linguistic, role semantics.25 Given these sorts of 
views about semantics, the unit of meaning is the complete linguistic or 
conceptual system and the holistic meaning of such a system is exclusively 
a function of the logical relations between the constitutive elements of such 
a system. Both Friedman and Kitcher appear to believe that understanding 
is a matter of reduction and involves a particular, broadly logical, relation 
between the sentences that constitute a total theory. They do not appear 
to accept that understanding involves anything more.26  
 This is a dubious assumption from the perspective of semantics, and it 
is a plausible way to link explanation to understanding only if it is legiti-
mate to ignore the ERA.27 If we resist this temptation and−recalling our the 
discussion of DES−recognize that numerical smaller systems of sentences 
need not be more semantically understandable, then we should conclude 
that unificationism does not, non-trivially and non-skeptically, connect ex-
planation and understanding. Given this observation about the incomplete-
ness of the unificationists’ views of understanding, we can then see, at least 
schematically, what an adequate theory of how explanation relates to sci-
entific understanding will look like.  
 First, as explanation in general and IBE in particular, must have some 
truth connection in accord with CA1-CA3, and, as the ERA suggests, we 
must include both semantic understanding (which is truth-conditional) and 
reductive understanding (which is more holistic) in our account of scientific 
                                                 
24  Note, however, that there are problems with the computational aspects of some 
forms of truth-conditional semantics as well. See, for example, (Shaffer 2019). 
25  See, for example, (Harman 1982). 
26  If it does, then they must face the ERA with respect to the basic, axiomatic, 
beliefs in a unified systematization. 
27  See (Fodor and Lepore 1991; and 1992). 
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understanding. Second, as we are primarily concerned with human under-
standing (which is limited) and should take pains to avoid skepticism about 
explanation, we must be sure that our theories of both reductive and se-
mantic understanding are both computationally tractable.28 As such, natu-
ralistic study of human computational abilities seems to be a required for 
the construction of a realistic theory of scientific understanding. Consider-
ations of global simplicity in the sense employed by the unificationists 
should then be rejected in favor of consideration of local notions of simplic-
ity and this must be conjoined with consideration of the meanings of the 
basic facts in the reducing theory. So a local body of phenomena is explained 
by reducing it to a relatively unified but cognitively graspable theory, the 
basic terms of which are semantically understood. But, science so under-
stood, is a piecemeal operation which often involves integrating local ex-
planatory theories with other previously established explanations. Under-
standing and explanation are then contextual, come in degrees and are often 
partial.29 In real scientific practice, we often only partially grasp and apply 
a given explanatory theory to a restricted phenomenal domain. Of course, 
there is much more to be said about what semantic understanding is and 
how explanatory integration works, but the theory of explanation suggested 
here promises the possibility of success where unificationism fails.  
5. Return to Peirce: local abduction and feasible explanation 
 There are some clear lessons to be learned from the failure of unifica-
tionism, and chief among these are the following results: (a) naturalistic 
epistemologists ought to reject global accounts of explanation, (b) explana-
tion and scientific understanding are, at least in part, fundamentally se-
mantic phenomena, and (c) all realistic accounts of explanation must in-
volve serious consideration of the concept of simplification. A theory of ex-
planation that rejects occult epistemology ought then to be constructed in 
such a way that it conforms to these desiderata, and it will look quite a bit 
                                                 
28  See (Shaffer 2019) about some concerns on this point with respect to possible 
worlds semantics. 
29  See (Shaffer 2012) on the partiality and contextuality of explanation. 
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more like Peirce’s original theory of local abduction than it will look like 
contemporary unificationist views such as those defended by Friedman and 
Kitcher. Some foundational work has been done here with respect to such 
an account, but there is much more work to be done in fleshing out the core 
concepts of an adequate account of explanation and scientific understanding 
that reflects these considerations. Amongst the most important tasks then 
to be undertaken are the tasks of fleshing out of a truth-conditional concept 
of semantic understanding, the determination of the limits of realistic glob-
alization in our belief systems, and determining how simplification, expla-
nation, and scientific understanding are related with respect to potentially 
integratable local explanations.  
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